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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
T he doctrine of the eternal recurrence played a central role in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.  While the doctrine’s centrality is indisputable, its function has been debated.  It has been interpreted variously as a 
traditional piece of metaphysics on the one hand, and as a psy-
chological test of the will’s commitment to a given action on the 
other.  In this paper, I undertake an exposition of the role of the 
eternal recurrence in relation to certain key features of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, such as the Overman and the will to 
power.  I will argue that the psychological test interpretation is to 
be preferred above the metaphysical interpretation.  While the 
metaphysical interpretation fails to harmonize with key features 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the psychological test interpretation 
harmonizes far better with them.  The metaphysical interpreta-
tion is to be rejected because i) it fails to act as the “heaviest bur-
den” that Nietzsche so heavily emphasizes,  ii) its ultimately de-
terministic undertones are inconsistent with Nietzsche’s insis-
tence on the freedom of the will, and iii) its identification with a 
natural law is incompatible with Nietzsche’s many rejections of 
laws, both natural and moral.  Finally, it shall be argued that we 
must understand the psychological test interpretation as apply-
ing only to the Overman. The doctrine is inapplicable to any 
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other audience, and many objections to Nietzsche’s thought can 
be avoided by taking this point into account.   
   
II. REVALUATION OF VALUES 
In The Joyful Wisdom 341 we find the first mention in Nietzsche's 
published works of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence:  "If that 
thought [of the eternal recurrence] acquired power over you as 
you are, it would transform you, and perhaps crush you; the 
question with regard to all and everything:  'Do you want this 
once more, and also for innumerable times?' would lie as the 
heaviest burden upon your activity.”  But before we can appreci-
ate the importance of this idea it is necessary to understand that 
Nietzsche saw the eternal recurrence as a replacement for tradi-
tional morality.  He felt the need to push down what was already 
crumbling, to question the grounds of traditional morality, to 
"shatter the old law-tables." 1 Throughout his works, Nietzsche 
offers a very powerful critique of nineteenth-century European 
morality, and it is only after we understand his critique and what 
he perceived as the inevitable collapse of traditional morality 
that we can understand how the doctrine of the eternal recur-
rence is intended to fill the resulting vacuum.  
Nietzsche sought to overthrow traditional morality for sev-
eral reasons.  One primary reason concerned the question of 
God’s existence.  Certainly a large part of traditional, i.e., Judeo-
Christian, morality is tightly tied to theism.  This connection can 
best be seen in the Decalogue.  Our views of morality are often 
inseparably linked to a divine command.  However, against this 
view of morality Nietzsche makes the famous claim through the 
mouth of a madman, 2 and later through the mouth of Zarathus-
tra, that "God is dead." 3 
To Nietzsche, the implications of this statement are terribly 
unsettling, and he was far from finding in this a cause for rejoic-
ing.  He referred to the collapse of traditional morality as a 
"lengthy, vast and uninterrupted process of crumbling, destruc-
tion, ruin and overthrow which is now imminent." 4  For 
Nietzsche, to say that God is dead is not to say that a god who 
once existed has died—as in Christianity—but to say that the 
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very idea of God is no longer worthy of belief.  The idea of God 
has died.  Christ now merits no more belief than a Zeus or an 
Odin.  All figures are equally myths, who have passed away.  
But beyond this, in a broader sense it means that the whole idea 
of an otherworldly realm, of a Kantian noumenon, of anything 
beyond this earthly existence, has also become unworthy of be-
lief. 5  Somewhat parenthetically, it can here be objected that the 
moral ruin that Nietzsche feared is not a logical consequence of 
the death of God unless one subscribes to the Divine Command 
Theory of morality.  According to this view, the existence of 
moral truths is dependent upon the existence of God, a point that 
is controversial and almost univocally rejected.  Whether 
Nietzsche himself accepted the Divine Command Theory may 
not be completely clear, but at the very least his fears do seem to 
be justified in light of the fact that the better part of humanity 
does subscribe to the Divine Command Theory, and may very 
likely believe nihilism to be the logical corollary of atheism.  
Although Nietzsche accepted the nonexistence of God, he 
was still uncomfortable with the many detrimental beliefs that 
are tied to this moribund idea in the popular imagination.  
Firstly, tied to this notion of God, mankind holds almost univer-
sally to belief in personal immortality, the belief in an afterlife.  
Nietzsche vehemently attacked this belief because he considered 
it an escape from this world into an otherworldly realm that does 
not exist.  Rather than living this life here and now in the fullest 
overflow of joy and power, one negates this world in a spirit of 
weakness and looks for a beyond.  But since there is nothing be-
yond this life, the desire for an afterlife is essentially a desire for 
nothingness.  Thus, Nietzsche accuses his religious and philoso-
phical contemporaries of being nihilists and “world calumnia-
tors.”  The belief in immortality “destroys all rationality, all natu-
ralness of instinct—all that is salutary, all that is life-furthering.” 6 
Another dangerous belief that is popularly thought to ema-
nate from the idea of God as lawgiver is the notion of a static re-
ality, i.e. laws, both moral and physical.  Moral laws are created 
by society in order to preserve the weak.  But the fixed nature of 
these laws is at odds with the nature of reality, which Nietzsche 
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tells us is essentially one of Heraclitean becoming.  Things con-
stantly change in a continuous flux, and to impose static rules 
upon humanity and nature is to deny the fact that reality con-
stantly changes.  "They will not learn that man has become. . . 
[that] everything has become:  there are no eternal facts, just as 
there are no absolute truths." 7 Nietzsche thus radically denies the 
existence of a rational and moral world order. 
Although Nietzsche recognizes the tenuous position in which 
the death of God leaves humanity, it would be a mistake to think 
that he believed the situation to be hopeless.  Quite to the con-
trary, he tried to separate his own position as far as possible from 
those perceived nihilists whom he was attacking, e.g., Schopen-
hauer.  His position is ultimately very optimistic.  With the death 
of God, mankind is free of all moral constraints.  The horizon is 
finally open for him to set out upon his own sea, to create his 
own values, to bring forth a new dawn. 8 And the new dawn will 
usher in a new kind of man.  In place of God and the weak Chris-
tian type of human, Nietzsche gives us the Overman. 9 
The Overman, the individual possessing the strongest will to 
power, creates his own values and does not allow them to be vul-
garized by the consensus of the masses, whom Nietzsche con-
temptuously branded as the “herd.”  But the sort of willpower 
that the Overman wields is first and foremost power over him-
self.  Nietzsche is very clear that the struggle and overcoming in 
which the Overman engages is, above all, self-overcoming.  This 
point will be discussed more fully later.   
Thus it can be seen that the collapse of traditional morality 
gives a few exceptional people the opportunity to exercise their 
creative potential in determining what is right for them as indi-
viduals.  And here it should be noted that, for Nietzsche, the de-
nial of objective value absolutely does not entail the denial of all 
value.  Value of all varieties, and not merely moral value, re-
mains as that which the Overman must create as the personal 
expression of his will to power.   
So, in his process of substitution thus far, Nietzsche has given 
us the Overman in place of God, and the earth in place of 
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heaven.  Finally, as we shall now see, he has given us the eternal 
recurrence in place of immortality.  
 
III. THE METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION                            
As already mentioned, the eternal recurrence can be interpreted 
as either a metaphysical doctrine, or as a psychological test, with 
cogent reasons for both views.  Having discussed Nietzsche’s 
revaluation of values, we shall now discuss the metaphysical in-
terpretation.  The metaphysical interpretation is the view that an 
infinite number of cycles of identical repetition actually take 
place in the universe.  Among other passages, the metaphysical 
interpretation seems to find support from certain statements in 
The Will to Power: 
 
In infinite time, every possible combination would at 
some time or another be realized; more:  it would be 
realized an infinite number of times.  And since be-
tween every combination and its next recurrence all 
other possible combinations would have to take place,  
a circular movement of absolutely identical series is 
thus demonstrated.10 
 
This passage seems to indicate that here Nietzsche is thinking of 
the eternal recurrence as something that is part of the objective 
structure of the universe, something like a law of nature.   
With regard to human existence, the implication of this view 
is that each of us has already lived this exact life an infinite num-
ber of times in the past, and will continue to live it an infinite 
number of times in the future.  As Nietzsche states in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: 
 
Now I die and decay . . . But the complex of causes in 
which I am entangled will recur--it will create me 
again!... I shall return eternally to this identical and self-
same life, in the greatest things and in the smallest, to 
teach once more the eternal recurrence of all things. 11 
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Firstly, in support of the metaphysical interpretation, it 
should be mentioned that Nietzsche did consider undertaking a 
more extensive study of the physical sciences to try to find sup-
port for this theory.  However, Nietzsche himself may have taken 
a somewhat equivocal position on this matter.  Our goal is not to 
find which interpretation is true, or even which Nietzsche be-
lieved to be true, but rather to find which interpretation better 
harmonizes with the body of his philosophical writings.  With 
that said, we shall turn to a critique of the metaphysical interpre-
tation.   
While the above passages do seem to lend a certain measure 
of plausibility to the metaphysical interpretation, several prob-
lems with this view quickly arise.  Firstly, this interpretation con-
flicts with Nietzsche’s conception of the eternal recurrence as the 
“greatest burden.”  And it does this specifically with regard to 
memory and suffering.  Supposing that the metaphysical inter-
pretation is the proper one, we are at an almost complete loss to 
make sense of Nietzsche’s reasons for describing the eternal re-
currence in these terms.  Presumably, Nietzsche is telling us that 
the idea of a lifetime’s worth of pain and anguish eternally re-
turning could crush us with despair.  With this anguish in mind, 
we are supposed to exercise our will carefully in making choices 
that would not lead us into eternal regret. 
But this attempt to make sense of the eternal recurrence as 
the greatest burden rests upon a deep misconception.  According 
to Nietzsche, the life to which we return is not a similar life.  It is 
exactly the same, down to the smallest details.  But then it would 
follow that in order for the events of one's present life to be iden-
tical to the events of one's previous life, there can be no memory 
of the previous life.  Because one does not have any memory of 
one's past recurrences, neither will one have any memory in a 
future recurrence.  This is to say that there is no "continuity of 
consciousness" between the cycles of existence. 12  Hence, there 
cannot be any accumulation of suffering throughout eternity be-
cause one cannot remember what one has already suffered in the 
previous cycles.  Nietzsche thinks that we can be guided by the 
consideration of whether or not we can will something eternally.  
11 
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However, in identical repetition, it takes no more courage to will 
something once than it does to will it infinitely. 13 
In this respect, the question of whether or not we could will 
to repeat something eternally would be a point of complete indif-
ference to us.  After we have suffered all that we will suffer in 
this life, that amount, although terrible, cannot increase by any 
memory of past suffering or dread of future suffering.  All pain 
in our future recurrence is beyond the range of our present con-
sciousness, thereby making us unable to experience it as we ex-
perience fear of pain later in this life.  It is "only by inappropri-
ately construing the suffering of some future recurrence on the 
model of suffering later in this life [that] the question of the eter-
nal recurrence of one's pain weigh[s] upon one with 'the greatest 
stress.' " 14 
Thus, the metaphysical interpretation of the eternal recur-
rence would seem to be problematic as a guide for one’s will, 
since there can be no accumulation of pain to help one avoid un-
wanted choices.  Presumably, it is pain or regret of some form 
that lies upon us as "the greatest burden," that gives us good rea-
sons to consider our actions very carefully.  However, if pain 
cannot increase beyond this life, then we cannot suffer anything 
worse than what we would suffer without identical repetition.  
The metaphysical doctrine seems to make Nietzsche's "greatest 
burden" less burdensome.   
A second problem with the metaphysical interpretation con-
cerns what appear to be the deterministic undertones of the doc-
trine.  It is a point of contention as to whether such a view poses 
a serious difficulty for free will.  As stated in the passage from 
The Will to Power quoted above, Nietzsche says that between 
every combination and its next recurrence all other possible com-
binations must take place.  A literal understanding of the eternal 
recurrence places the strongest kind of necessity upon all of the 
material world, human existence included.   
On this view, our choices acquire less weight, since we are 
not really free to make them.  We are caught within a nexus of 
possible combinations that demand actualization.  Any choice 
that one makes, since that choice would be the result of a possi-
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Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence 
ble combination, would have to take place.  If our choices are de-
termined by a previous state of the world, and if these choices 
must conform exactly to the choices of an infinite number of pre-
vious cycles, then we are not free to make those choices.  The 
question of whether we could will something eternally would be 
completely irrelevant for us, since we would be eternally com-
mitted to it anyway.  Further, asking ourselves the question at all 
seems to be an attempt to surreptitiously slip in the thought that 
we are in a first cycle, that we are in possession of a tabula rasa 
with regard to our actions.  But in infinite time there can be no 
first cycle, and hence no first choice.  There is always already an 
infinite number of cycles behind us.   
Perhaps the most ironic thing about this rather unpalatable 
conclusion is that such determinism seems to be at odds with 
Nietzsche’s numerous attempts to help us place the deepest sig-
nificance upon our choices, and with his many passages discuss-
ing the freedom of the will.  And it is because of these "fatalistic 
overtones" that Schacht considers a metaphysical interpretation 
to be “one of Nietzsche's thought-experiments which fails.” 15   
A final problem with the metaphysical interpretation is that it 
may also be objected that interpreting the eternal recurrence as 
an objective statement of how nature operates would place a 
glaring inconsistency in Nietzsche’s philosophy.   He scrupu-
lously avoids attempting to give insight into the nature of the 
world as it actually is—the thing-in-itself—and he despised phi-
losophers and scientists who attempted this.  In The Joyful Wis-
dom, he tells us that we ought to "beware of saying there are laws 
in nature.”16 Where scientists think that they are truly explaining 
things, in reality they are only describing things better than those 
in previous ages have done. 17 
So, to think that Nietzsche intended the eternal recurrence to 
function as a law of nature is to place him at the receiving end of 
his own fierce criticisms.  Just like every other attempt at formu-
lating natural law that he objects to, such a scientific position 
would attempt to fix the nature of reality, which Nietzsche has 
already told us is one of change and flux.  This is certainly not 
the most charitable interpretation of Nietzsche’s work.  In con-
13 
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clusion, the metaphysical interpretation simply does not work.  It 
fails to harmonize with the key features of Nietzsche’s thought.  
However, this failure of the metaphysical doctrine does not de-
tract from the doctrine's usefulness as a psychological test. 18 Of 
course, it is clearly not the case that the failure of the metaphysi-
cal interpretation entails the success of the psychological test in-
terpretation.  The latter must be judged on its own merit.   
 
IV. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST INTERPRETATION 
To view the eternal recurrence as a kind of decision-making pro-
cedure for the will presents itself as the more plausible interpre-
tation. In the collapse of moral absolutes, the will — which is 
“beyond good and evil”— has filled the void.  Nevertheless, the 
unbounded will needs some guide to outline what is (for the in-
dividual, at least) the preferred course of action.  As quoted 
above, Nietzsche says that we should create our values by asking 
ourselves whether or not we can will them eternally. 19 Although 
we will not eternally recur, we ought to choose as though we will 
recur, as though we would have to repeat our actions forever.  In 
the words of Kaufmann, we must understand the eternal recur-
rence “not as a dogma but as a hypothesis.” 20 Thus, rather than a 
scientific theory, the eternal recurrence is meant to act as a practi-
cal guide to our actions.  If, upon reflection, we decide that we 
cannot will a particular action forever, then we should probably 
refrain from it.    
to make ethical decisions, since ultimately there are no such 
things as ethical decisions: “There are no moral phenomena at 
all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena.” 21 It is cer-
tainly not Nietzsche's intention to give any supreme principle of 
morality.  Supreme principles of morality —specifically the cate-
gorical imperative, for Nietzsche — are all equally guilty of 
glossing over the highly individual nature of each particular ac-
tion.  “By means of them [supreme moral principles], indeed, a 
semblance of equality can be attained, but only a semblance,—that 
in outlook and retrospect every action is, and remains, an im-
14 
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When considering the eternal recurrence, it is very important
not to confuse it with a moral principle intended to help one
Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence 
penetrable affair.” 22 
While there have been attempts to compare the eternal recur-
rence to the categorical imperative, these are ultimately very mis-
guided.  A person who chooses his or her course of action based 
on whether they could will it for eternity has in mind certain 
psychological considerations and consequences.  However, this 
is far from Kant’s position, which stresses the logical consistency 
of maxims and places no consideration upon consequences, psy-
chological or otherwise. 23 The contrast between Nietzsche and 
Kant is thereby one of consequentialism versus deontology.   
Against Kant, Nietzsche calls on us to be the active creators of 
our own values, to find what judgments are the expressions of 
our will to power, rather than to follow a supreme principle that 
is often someone else’s expression of their will to power.  “A vir-
tue has to be our invention, our most personal defense and neces-
sity:  in any other sense it is merely a danger.  ‘Virtue,’ as Kant 
desired it, is harmful.” 24  
The eternal recurrence is potentially very powerful as a guide 
because it forces one to refrain from committing to a given action 
unless one can support that action with the entire will.  Nietzsche 
would not have us making careless decisions, but rather placing 
the highest consideration upon each choice.  Since this life is the 
only opportunity that we have, we must act with the fullest 
measure of strength and freedom here and now. Nietzsche con-
ceived of the eternal recurrence as the greatest illustration of life-
affirmation that we can possibly display.  It is tightly knit to his 
idea of amor fati, love of one’s fate.  To be able to eternally will 
the repetition of our life means “that one wants nothing to be dif-
ferent, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity.” 25 It means 
a justification of the world and of our lives with all of our pleas-
ure and pain.  Ultimately, it is the ability to love even the suffer-
ing of our life that gives life its justification and purpose. 
Further, the eternal recurrence does not demand any kind of 
consistency in what we will, and so what we will in one moment 
may not be what we will in the next.  Changing our mind is per-
fectly consistent with the idea of creation and becoming.  How-
ever, this is not to say that choice is arbitrary.  As Nietzsche tells 
15 
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us, the “good” decisions are those that are the expression of 
power, and the “bad” those that are the expression of weakness.  
“What is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will 
to power, power itself in man.  What is bad?—All that proceeds 
from weakness.” 26  Thus, while particular expressions of the will 
to power will undoubtedly vary, the “good” choices are those 
that proceed from power.  
But the generality of our discussion thus far may create some 
confusion.  One potential point of misunderstanding about the 
eternal recurrence may arise from a failure to realize Nietzsche's 
audience.  To Nietzsche’s credit, he was fully aware that the eter-
nal recurrence was not for everyone, and very serious problems 
arise if one ignores this fact and thinks that he intended it for so-
ciety.  Nothing could be further from the truth, and Nietzsche’s 
works contain numerous attempts to clarify this point.  In Ecce 
Homo Nietzsche explicitly says, "I never speak to masses." 27 Else-
where, he explains how he has both chosen who his reader is, 
and who he is not.  A writer not only wants to be understood, 
but he also wants to be misunderstood by those to whom he is 
not writing. 28  Examples could be multiplied, but the fact that 
Nietzsche deliberately made many of his works unclear to the 
average reader seems a sufficient indication that he was not writ-
ing for everyone, but rather to the strong individual.  The very 
esoteric character of his works forces one to learn to read him 
very carefully, a mental exertion for which most readers will not 
have the patience. 29  
His doctrine presupposes an exceptional individual, one who 
can create his own values and will them eternally without exter-
nal help.  It is totally inadequate for any other type of person, 
and is not strong enough for the masses; or perhaps it would be 
truer to say that the masses are too weak for it.  And this is the 
primary point:  The eternal recurrence is fundamentally and in-
extricably tied to Nietzsche’s conception of the Overman.  It loses 
its effectiveness with any other person.  
Nietzsche fully recognized that the radical stance of his phi-
losophy, e.g., the denial of objective value, would usher in tur-
moil.  His attempt to correct millennia of lies—his revaluation—
16 
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would inevitably lead to unprecedented conflict. 30 But lest it be 
thought that Nietzsche was insensitive to the upheavals that his 
philosophy was likely to cause, it should be noted that he ac-
knowledged that the task of liberation from convention was a 
very delicate one.  As he says in The Wanderer and His Shadow, 
“only the ennobled man may be given freedom of spirit.... In any 
other mouth his motto would be dangerous.” 31  
The weak individual should absolutely not liberate himself 
from traditional morality, and Nietzsche had no intention of try-
ing to liberate him.  Instead, this person should stay bound.  The 
masses need strong external coercion, e.g., the state, Christianity, 
etc., to keep them under control.  As Nietzsche succinctly tells us 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "he who cannot obey himself will be 
commanded.” 32 Freedom should only be given to those who are 
strong enough for it.  To remove all restraints from the masses 
would be to loose true anarchy upon the world, a form of behav-
ior which Nietzsche detested as much as he did Christianity. 33 
When his philosophy is used to advance anarchy or anti-
Semitism, we should keep in mind that this was the opposite of 
his intentions.  Nietzsche’s comments on such positions are de-
cidedly negative, and only a willful misreading such as that of 
the Nazis can invite misunderstanding.  Those who defend such 
positions with Nietzsche's philosophy are ignoring Nietzsche’s 
clear condemnations of such views and trying to enjoy the free-
dom of the destroyer without paying the high price of the crea-
tor.  
And the creator does pay a high price.  Although it may seem 
as though the creator is wildly free and uninhibited after having 
cast off all moral restraint, Nietzsche tells us that the very reverse 
is the case.  Behind every action must be the consideration of 
whether that action can be willed forever.  Such a person has to 
choose here and now, and cannot look for escape in a beyond.  
Only such an individual truly lives with the full consciousness of 
her own complete freedom.  As the creator of her own laws, she 
must also be her own judge and punish herself when she violates 
those laws.  And "it is terrible to be alone with the judge and 
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avenger of one's own law." 34   
But here an obvious question may be asked.  What happens if 
the Overman’s values conflict with the values of society in such a 
way that hostility becomes inevitable?  This is certainly to be ex-
pected at some point.  Judging by the emphasis that Nietzsche 
places upon the ideas of upheaval, chaos, and war, is seems im-
possible that the Overman can peacefully coexist with society.  In 
his better interests, the Overman may decide to live in solitude, 
something for which Nietzsche frequently affirms the need, e.g. 
Zarathustra’s residence on a mountaintop as a recluse.  How-
ever, solitude is for the sake of the Overman rather than for the 
safety of society, since interaction with the latter may prevent the 
Overman from fully creating his own values, from achieving the 
highest exercise of his will to power.  Nietzsche tells us that al-
though powerful, the type of human that he is seeking is also 
very delicate, and has often been destroyed by society.  Through-
out the ages, he has been a "fortunate accident... never as some-
thing willed." 35 Certainly never willed, because his powerful in-
stinctual nature makes him a terrifying creature for society.  But 
the well-being of the masses and the Overman’s ability to peace-
fully coexist with them was not part of Nietzsche’s concern.   
But we must expand upon this point.  If the Overman hurts 
his neighbor while creating his values, then this cannot be 
avoided.  But, intentionally hurting others is not part of the  
Overman’s character.  Rather, any harm done to society during 
the creation of values is only incidental and is not part of the 
Overman’s deliberate intentions.  So, contra many misunder-
standings of his thought, “tyranny over others is not part of 
Nietzsche’s vision, though the failure to indulge in it is no virtue 
unless one has the power to become a tyrant and refrains deliber-
ately.” 36 Refusal to enter into tyranny over others is a further ex-
pression of the Overman’s will to power.  And the power that the 
Overman wields is first and foremost to be understood as power 
over himself, rather than power over others.  In this respect, 
Nietzsche’s conception of the Overman is very similar to Aris-
totle’s view of the noble and virtuous person, and much under-
standing of Nietzsche can be gained by a comparison to Aris-
18 
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totle.  Neither philosopher is concerned with morality proper, 
but rather with a person’s ability to be noble, disciplined, and 
self-controlled.  Numerous passages in Nietzsche show the pow-
erful influence of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and in this re-
spect, Nietzsche’s conception of the ideal man is very similar to 
the classical Greek view of the virtuous man.    
To return to our discussion of the Overman’s relation to soci-
ety, Nietzsche never promises that the Overman would help to 
bring about an orderly society.  Indeed, those looking for a sys-
tem with which to build an orderly society should look else-
where, because order was never Nietzsche's intention.  To at-
tempt to construct an orderly society from Nietzsche’s philoso-
phy, we would have to completely overlook passages where he 
speaks of his Dionysian nature, the nature that "encompasses joy 
in destruction." 37 And again he tells us that “the last thing I 
should promise would be to ‘improve’ mankind.  No new idols 
are erected by me.” 38  As Kaufmann has so aptly put it, “For 
Nietzsche, the Overman does not have instrumental value for the 
maintenance of society:  he is valuable in himself because he em-
bodies the state of being that has the only ultimate value there is; 
and society is censured insofar as it insists on conformity and 
impedes his development.” 39  
 
V. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To conclude our discussion of the psychological test interpreta-
tion of the eternal recurrence, we must recognize that it harmo-
nizes with the body of Nietzsche’s thought far better than the 
metaphysical interpretation does.  The former ties in with the key 
motifs of Nietzsche’s philosophy such as the Overman, the will 
to power, and his method of speaking to the individual far more 
effectively than the metaphysical doctrine can.  This ability of the 
eternal recurrence so interpreted to make Nietzsche’s thought 
coherent seems a persuasive reason to accept it as the more vi-
able interpretation.  
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NOTES 
 
1  Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 214.   
2  Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 125. 
3  Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 2. 
4   
5  On the issue of Nietzsche’s critique of Kantian noumena and 
God, see Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 335. 
6  Nietzsche, The Antichrist, 43. 
7  Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 2. 
8  
9  I have chosen to follow Kaufmann in translating the German 
Übermensch as Overman, rather than its oft-used alternative trans-
lation Superman, since the former seems to be more in keeping 
with the German meaning, and with Nietzsche’s specific refer-
ences to self-overcoming.  See Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, 
Psychologist, Antichrist, 307. 
10  Nietzsche, Will to Power, 1066. 
11  Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 237.     
12  Solomon, Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, 335. 
13  Hatab, Nietzsche and the Eternal Recurrence: The Redemption of 
Time and Becoming, 113. 
14  Solomon, Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, 340. 
15  Schacht, Nietzsche, 265. 
16  Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 109. 
17  Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 112. 
18  Schacht, Nietzsche, 266. 
19  Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 341. 
20  Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 332. 
21  Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 108. 
22  Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 335. 
23  Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 322. 
24  Nietzsche, The Antichrist, 11. 
25  Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 258. 
26  Nietzsche, The Antichrist, 2. 
27  Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 353.   
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 Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 343.
Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 343.
28  Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 381. 
29   For other passages in which Nietzsche discusses the deliberate 
lack of clarity of his works, see Beyond Good and Evil, 30, 40, 230, 
270, 278, 289, and 290. 
30  See Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 353. 
31  Nietzsche, The Wanderer and his Shadow, 350. 
32  Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 136. 
33  See Nietzsche, The Antichrist, 57. 
34  Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 88. 
35  Nietzsche, The Antichrist, 3. 
36  Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 316. 
37  Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 5. 
38  Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 2. 
39  Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 315.  
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